Abstract-Border Gateway Protocol allows Autonomous Systems (ASs) to apply diverse routing policies for selecting routes and for propagating reachability information to other ASs. Although a significant number of studies have been focused on the Internet topology, little is known about what routing policies network operators employ to configure their networks. In this paper, we infer and characterize routing policies employed in the Internet. We find that routes learned from customers are preferred over those from peers and providers, and those from peers are typically preferred over those from providers. We present an algorithm for inferring and characterizing export policies. We show that ASs announce their prefixes to a selected subset of providers. The main reasons for the selective announcement are due to traffic engineering strategy for controlling incoming traffic. The impact of these routing policies might be significant. For example, many Tier-1 ASs reach their (direct or indirect) customers via their peers instead of customers. Furthermore, the selective announcement routing policies imply that there are much less available paths in the Internet than shown in the AS connectivity graph. We hope that our findings will caution network operators in choosing the selective announcement routing policy for traffic engineering. Finally, we study export policies to peers and find that ASs tend to announce all of their prefixes to other peers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on systematically understanding routing policies applied in the Internet.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE Internet connects thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASs) operated by many different administrative domains such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), companies and universities. Routing between ASs is determined by the interdomain routing protocol, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] . A key feature of BGP is that it allows ASs to adopt diverse routing policies to control the selection of routes and propagate reachability information to other ASs. For example, a multihomed AS can control the in-bound traffic link by propagating prefixes to a subset of its providers only. Therefore, the prefix can be reached only through the subset of its providers. As a result, connectivity does not mean reachability in the Internet and the extent of the reachability is determined by both connectivity and routing policies. Although a signif- Understanding routing policies applied in the Internet has several implications. First, it is important to have a global view of the routing policies applied. Clearly, each ISP has information about its own routing policies. However, many ASs are unwilling to reveal their routing policies to others. Furthermore, the routing information contained in Internet Routing Registry (IRR) [9] is either incomplete or out-of-date. Therefore, there is no global view of the typical routing polices configured in an AS. Second, the global view of routing policies might have implications on important properties of Internet. As we mentioned above, the connectivity in the Internet does not mean reachability since routing polices might lead to less available paths. Moreover, this can lead to implications on robustness of the Internet. Third, being able to infer routing polices of other ASs might allow an AS to perform traffic engineering effectively. To control traffic flow, network operators can change their routing policies to shift traffic load among multiple candidate routing paths. This task can be performed if candidate routing paths can be predicted by inferring routing policies of ASs involved.
In this paper, we first infer and characterize import routing policies. In particular, we infer the route preference setting among routes learned from providers, customers and peers. From a large collection of routing tables, we find that in most cases, route preference conforms to AS relationships. That is, routes learned from customers are typically preferred over those from providers or peers, and routes learned from peers are typically preferred over those from providers. In addition, we observe that about 98% of route preference assignments are simply based on next hop ASs.
Second, we present an algorithm for inferring export policies and characterize the export policies. We infer how an AS announces its routes to its (direct or indirect) providers. Our results show that a significant number of ASs announce their prefixes to a selected subset of providers. Furthermore, the selective announcement is prevalent and persistently present. We investigate the cause of the selective announcement. We find that prefix splitting and aggregation are not the main reasons for it. The majority of the cases are due to the traffic engineering practice for controlling incoming traffic. That is, an AS may announce their prefixes only to a subset of their direct providers, or to their direct providers with a community tag indicating that the prefixes should not be announced further. Although the selective announcement routing policies are not surprising, the impact of these routing policies might be significant. For example, many Tier-1 ASs reach their (direct or indirect) customers via their peers instead of customers. That is, selective announcement might lead to "curving" routes in which a peer route is used when there is a customer route from the AS connectivity graph. Furthermore, the selective announcement routing policies imply that there are much less available paths in the Internet than shown in the AS connectivity graph. We hope that our findings will caution network operators in choosing the selective announcement routing policy for traffic engineering. Finally, we study export policy to peers. We observe that most ASs tend to export all of their prefixes to their peers.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on systematically understanding routing policies applied in the Internet. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the Internet architecture and routing policies. Section 3 presents our data source. In section 4, we describe our methodology for inferring import policies and the characteristics of the import policies. Then, in section 5, we present algorithms for inferring export policies and characterize the export policies. We conclude the paper with a summary in section 6.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first present an overview of the Internet architecture, and then describe Internet routing policies.
A. Internet Architecture
Routing within ASs is achieved by the Interior Gateway Protocols (IGP). Routing information between ASs is determined by BGP, which includes interior BGP (iBGP) and exterior BGP (eBGP). eBGP exchanges reachability information between ASs, while iBGP exchanges exterior reachability information within an AS.
ASs negotiate agreements to achieve two forms of AS relationships between various networks, namely providerto-customer and peer-to-peer. A pair of ASs such that one offers Internet connectivity to the other is said to have a provider-to-customer relationship; a pair of ASs provide connectivity between their respective customers is said to have a peer-to-peer relationship. We propose to represent AS relationships by an annotated AS graph. An annotated AS graph is a graph
where the node set ¤ consists of ASs and the edge set¨are classified into provider-to-customer, customerto-provider, and peer-to-peer edges. Fig. 1 shows an example of an annotated AS graph. In this example, AS2 is the provider of AS4, and AS4 is a customer of AS2. AS3 peers with AS4.
B. Routing Policies
Routing policies are a set of rules that are configured by network operators such that one AS can determine how to select the best routes, and whether to propagate its best routes to neighboring ASs. Routing policies include import policies and export policies.
B.1 Import Routing Policies
From each neighbor, a router receives a set of route announcements. In order to distinguish routes from different neighbors, we define a route received from a customer as customer route, and the AS path the route traversed as customer path; a route received from a provider as provider route, and the AS path the route traversed as provider path; a route received from a peer as peer route, and the AS path the route traversed as peer path. We will use those terms to help us inferring routing policies through this paper. Each route announcement contains a set of attributes, AS path, multi-exit discriminator, next hop, and community [10] . Those attributes are used for defining routing policies.
After receiving a route announcement, a BGP router discards the route if its own AS number is present in the AS path to avoid a loop in AS path. The router then applies import policies to this route which include denying, or permitting a route, and assigning a local preference to indicate how favorable the route is. The preference is a value used to rank routes received from different neighboring ASs. Note that the first route selection picks the route with the highest local preference value. In this paper, we focus on local preference setting in import policies.
B.2 Export Routing Policies
After selecting the best route, a BGP router will propagate only the best route to its neighboring ASs. Export policies allow the router to determine whether to advertise the best route to a neighbor. Export policies include permitting or denying a route, assigning MED to control the inbound traffic, tagging a BGP community to indicate what preference a neighboring AS should assign to it, and prepending AS paths or redistributing its prefixes to affect the inbound traffic. The configuration of export policies is similar to that of import policies. It can be based on AS path or prefix.
The following rules are well known BGP export policies [14] :
Exporting to provider: A customer can export to its providers its routes and the routes learned from its own customers, but cannot export routes learned from other providers or peers.
Exporting to customer: A provider can export to its customers its routes, the routes learned from the other customers, its providers, and its peers.
Exporting to peer: A peer can export to another peer its routes, the routes learned from its customers, but cannot export the routes learned from its providers and other peers.
We note that the best route in an AS depends on the routes coming from its neighboring ASs which apply export policies, as well as the import policies of the AS. In our following works, we assume that every AS accepts all route announcements from its neighbors.
III. SOURCES OF DATA
We conduct our analysis using data sources from Oregon RouteView server [15] and the Looking Glass servers [16] . The goal of Oregon RouteView is to provide the global routing system from the perspectives of several different backbones and locations around the Internet. On Nov. 2002, it peered with 56 ASs which announce their default-free routes to it. Those ASs include nearly all Tier-1 ASs in the Internet, such as AS1239 (Sprint) and AS7018 (AT&T).
Besides BGP tables from Oregon RouteView, we use 15 ASs' BGP tables from the Looking Glass servers. These tables include 3 Tier-1 ASs, AS1, AS3549, and AS7018. Through their Looking Glass servers, we can retrieve finegrain routing information, such as Local Preference, and BGP community. Combining BGP tables from RouteView and local ASs' routers, we have 68 tables from different ASs. Table I shows the name, degree, and location of each AS. Among them, 42 ASs are managed by ISPs in North America. 33 ASs are managed by ISPs in Europe, 3 ASs in Australia, 2 ASs in Asia. The sizes of these ASs span a large range. For example, AT&T (AS7018) has a degree of 1330, and Lirex Net (AS8262) has a degree of 14. We believe that those data sources are sufficient for our study. All BGP tables are downloaded on Nov.11, 2002, and Nov. 18, 2002. Our study relies on AS relationships. There are several novel algorithms which can be used to infer AS relationships from a collection of BGP routing tables [11] [8] [12] . Here, we choose the one described in [11] . In section IV-C, we show that the potential error introduced by inferred AS relationships is small.
IV. INFERRING IMPORT POLICIES
One of the most important aspects of import policies is to set local preference. Local preference can be used to influence the selection of the best path among a set of routes, and control outgoing traffic. First, we infer route preference among routes from providers, customers and peers. Then we analyze the consistency of local preference setting with next hop ASs.
A. Route Preference Among Provider, Customer, and Peer Routes
BGP default routing policy which selects the route with shortest AS path length is overridden by routing policies that set local preference. Network operators usually assign different local preference values to customer, provider, and peer routes. We use local BGP routing tables shown in Table I to discover route preference. After knowing AS relationships between an AS and its neighbors and deriving local preference from those tables, we associate each neighbor, or customer, provider and peer, with one or more local preference values. Hence, we compare local preference values among different routes. We define:
Typical Local Preference: customer routes have higher local preference than peer routes and provider routes, and peer routes have higher local preference than provider routes.
Anomaly Local Preference: peer routes or provider routes have no lower local preference than customer routes, or provider routes have no lower local preference than peer routes. Table II shows the percentage of prefixes which have typical local preference for each AS. We observe that the percentage of anomaly preference for each AS is very small. Those 15 ASs include 3 Tier-1 ASs (AS1, AS3549, and AS7018), 2 Tier-2 ASs (AS5511, and AS7474), and other 10 ASs. Even though those ASs are a small fraction of ASs in the Internet, we believe that our chosen ASs are useful for studying import policies in the Internet. Therefore, we conclude that local preference value for a customer is typically higher than for a provider and peer, and that for a peer is higher than that for a provider.
B. Consistency of Local Preference with Next Hop ASs
As we mentioned above, operators may set local preference value on prefix level or next hop AS level. It is easy for network operators maintain local preference configuration based on next hop AS level. This motivates us to study the consistency of local preference values with next hop ASs. We use 14 ASs in our dataset to study the consistency. Fig. 2 (a) shows that most of the ASs assign a unique local preference value for each next hop AS.
All routing tables that we use are collected from only one router at each AS. In order to understand if local preference values are consistent within an AS, we use AT&T routing tables (Jan. 4, 2002) combined from 30 backbone routers to study the consistency. Fig. 2(b) shows that most local preference values assigned in AT&T are based on its next hop ASs. ASs tend to assign local preference values based on next hop AS instead of on prefix or AS path.
C. Potential Error Introduced by Inferred AS Relationships
Since studying routing policies relies on AS relationships, a large number of ASs with incorrectly inferred AS relationships will affect our conclusion about import policies. We use BGP community to verify some inferred AS relationships. One of the most common usages of community values is to tag the routes received from specific neighbor ASs. In this case, an AS defines different community values for its customers, peers, and transit providers. When border routers of the AS receive a route from its neighbors, they tag the route with a community indicating the relationship with those neighboring ASs. Details about this method are described in the Appendix. Table III shows that the AS relationships between 9 ASs and their neighboring ASs are verified. As shown in the table, for those 9 ASs, most of their AS relationships are correctly inferred. Therefore, the potential error introduced by inferred AS relationship is so small that it will not affect our results. 
V. INFERRING EXPORT POLICIES
How to announce prefixes to a customer, peer, or provider is an important component of export policies. For a provider, it has to announce all of its prefixes, or default route to its customers depending on their agreements. However, a customer may advertise its prefixes to either all of its providers, or a subset of providers. In the latter case, customers can control their inbound traffic on a heavy traffic link by switching some prefix announcements away from the link. Peers also have control over their prefix announcements to other peers. Here, we focus on two problems in export policies:
1. Export to provider: strategies a customer uses to export prefixes to its provider. 2. Export to peer: strategies a peer uses to export prefixes to its peers. 
A. Export to Provider
In this section, we first describe an algorithm to infer export policies which customers use to advertise their prefixes to direct or indirect providers. Then we characterize these export policies.
A.1 Algorithm for Inferring Export Policies to Providers
The direct way to infer a customer's export policies is to use the BGP table from its provider. After searching prefixes originated by the customer in the table, if those prefixes have customer routes, which we defined above, it indicates that the customer exports those prefixes to the provider. On the contrary, if those prefixes do not exist or do not have customer routes, it implies that the customer does not export them to the provider directly.
Therefore, we infer the export policies for customers from the viewpoint of a provider. As we described above, a customer can exports prefixes to all of its providers or a subset of providers. For a given provider, if the provider receives a prefix originated by a customer via a peer path instead of a customer path, we call this prefix as a selective announced prefix (SA prefix) with respect to the provider. Here, we use our analysis result that customer's selective announcement policies give rise to SA prefixes. We will discuss the causes of SA prefixes in section V-A.5. As a result, the selective announcement used by customers can be observed from viewpoint of a provider. For example, in Fig. 3 section IV-A, we know that a customer route is typically preferred over other routes. In a provider's BGP table, if a customer route to a prefix exists, the route is the best route as well. Otherwise, if a customer route does not exist, the best routes are peer routes or provider routes. The first step of the algorithm for inferring export policies to provider is to find if an AS is a customer of a given provider. This can be solved by using Depth First Search (DFS) algorithm in a directed graph to find a customer path. If there is a customer path from the AS to the provider, it is a customer of the provider. Not all paths found by DFS can be customer paths, however, these paths should obey export rules described in section II-B. That is, from the direction of provider down to customer, each pair of ASs in the path should have provider-to-customer relationship. In an annotated AS graph
, we use modified DFS which satisfies path relationship constrains to find a customer path.
The next step is to investigate if the best routes to the customer' prefixes are peer or provider routes. If the best routes are peer or provider routes, those prefixes are not exported from the customer to the provider, or some intermediate customers who receive those prefixes do not export them to it. Fig . 4 shows the algorithm in detail. Given an AS, we use this algorithm repeatedly for all of the AS's customers to infer those customers' export policies.
A.2 Prevalence of SA Prefixes
Here, we present experimental results of inferring export prefixes to provider using the algorithm. We first use dataset described in section III to construct the annotated AS graph which is used to find all direct or indirect customers of a given provider. We then use the routes from Oregon or local BGP tables to derive the best routes to customers' prefixes. SA prefixes for 10 Tier-1 ASs can be inferred by using Oregon RouteView and 3 Tier-1 ASs' local BGP tables. Table IV shows that the percentage of customers' prefixes which are SA prefixes for 16 ASs. We find that Tier-1 ASs, such as AS1, AS3549, and AS7018, have a significant number of SA prefixes. Those Tier-1 ASs reach their (direct or indirect) customers via their peers instead of customers. For example, in Fig. 5, AS6280 is a customer of AS1. However, AS1 does not receive a prefix p originated by AS6280 from AS852. It receives p from its peer, AS3549. Note that SA prefixes for a provider may be due to the selective announcement policies of originating ASs or intermediate ASs. For example, in Fig. 5 , the SA prefix for AS1 may be due to the selective announcement policies employed by AS6280 or AS852.
Next, we examine SA prefixes from the viewpoint of a set of customers. We consider those customers which all have 3 direct or indirect providers: AS1, AS3549, and AS7018. From those customers, we select 8 ASs which originate a significant number of prefixes as shown in Table V. Table V shows that those 3 providers cannot access some of customers' prefixes directly via their customer paths.
Applying the selective announcement policies, a cus- tomer can balance its inbound traffic but its inbound and outbound traffic might be asymmetric. From the aspect of a provider, it may find that traffic between its customers has to forward to the rest of Internet via its heavy loaded peer links. This strategy may affect traffic engineering practice of the provider.
A.3 Verification of SA Prefixes
Because SA prefixes depend on AS relationships, the work of our verification is to confirm the validity of all AS relationships which are used to infer SA prefixes. When we infer customers export policies, or selective announcement policy, using the algorithm described before, we first investigate if the AS which originates the SA prefix is a customer of a given provider, and then the AS relationship between the provider and the next hop AS of the best route to the prefix is examined. We verify SA prefixes by following steps:
Step 1: Verify AS relationships between a given provider and its neighboring ASs. As described in section IV-C , the AS relationships between 9 ASs in Table III and their neighboring ASs are verified by using BGP community as shown in the Appendix. Such small error in inferring AS relationships can be neglected. In our following verification, we select 3 Tier-1 ASs, AS1, AS3549, and AS7018, to verify since a large number of SA prefixes are observed from those 3 ASs. The result from Table III also implies that the peer relationship between those 3 providers and their next hop ASs in the best route are verified.
Step 2: Verify the customer relationship between an AS which originates a SA prefix and a given provider. Because an AS can be a direct or indirect customer of a provider, we first verify the direct customers. It is very simple to verify direct customers since we already verify AS relationships between those 3 providers and their neighboring ASs. For indirect customer, we need to verify all AS relationships between each pair of ASs in the customer path which is used in the algorithm described in Fig. 4 to infer a SA prefix. Our method is to investigate the existence of the customer path in the Internet. Even though the customer path is derived from our algorithm, it is possible that some other prefixes are really announced through it. We call a customer path active if other prefixes traverse the same path. By searching all paths in BGP routing tables, we determine whether a customer path for a SA prefix is active or not. Given a customer path, for example, We verify all SA prefixes for AS1, AS3549, and AS7108 according to the steps described above. Table VI shows that most of SA prefixes for those 3 ASs are verified.
Besides verifying AS relationships, for each AS, if its import policies are already inferred, we only consider those prefixes that have typical local preference. That is, prefixes from peers have lower local preference than those from customers, or prefixes from providers have lower local preference than those from peers. We note that the percentage of anomaly local preference is small in Table II , and will not affect our results.
A.4 Persistence of SA Prefixes
Having identified the prevalence of SA prefixes, we now turn our attention to SA prefix persistence. Network operators may change prefix exporting pattern at different time. To find out how persistent SA prefixes are over a period of measurement time, BGP tables for March 2002 from Oregon RouteView are used. We are also interested in how SA prefixes change during one day, so we use data from Oregon RouteView on March 15, 2002. Here, we only present the result of AS1 because it has the most SA prefixes. Fig. 6(a) shows the number of SA prefixes during March, 2002. Note that drops in Fig. 6(a) are due to disconnections of some peers of Oregon RouteView server. Fig. 6(b) shows the number of SA prefixes on that day (March 15, 2002) . From Fig. 6 , we find that SA prefixes are consistently present in AS1.
As we mentioned above, network operators might change their routing policies to control incoming traffic. To find out how export policies affect the existence of SA prefixes, we define the times each prefix appears during the measuring time as uptime. SA prefix uptime is defined as the times a SA prefix appears. The maximum uptime of a prefix during our measurement is 31 days or 24 hours depending on which view of the data we are examining. We study how many prefixes shift from SA prefix to non-SA prefix during the whole period. For example, some prefixes have 31 updates but less than 31 SA prefix updates during the whole month. Those prefixes shift from SA prefixes to non-SA prefixes. From Fig. 7 , we observe that about one sixth of SA prefixes are not stable during one month, but most of them are stable during one-day period. Changes in routing policies can affect existence of SA prefixes.
A.5 Causes of SA Prefixes
It seems that SA prefixes depend on the connectivities between a pair of ASs (a provider and a customer). The provider has two different connectivities to the customer: a direct customer path, and a "curving" peer path. This lead us to analyze the way that customers connect to their providers: multihomed and single-homed. Fig. 8(a) shows that customer is multihomed to two providers. Path is the best path, and path ! is a customer path from to . The best path and the customer path are disjoint paths. Fig. 8(b) shows that customer is singlehomed. Path "
is the best path, and path ! is a customer path from to . They have common paths. We examine the connectivities between customers of AS1, AS3549, and AS7018 and those 3 ASs. From Table VII, we find that among those customers whose announced prefixes are SA prefixes, about 75% of them are multihomed, and others are single-homed. In the multihomed case, origin ASs or intermediate ASs may apply selective announcement policies to prefixes. In the singlehomed case, only intermediate ASs which are multihomed can apply selective announcement policies to their prefixes or their customers' prefixes. Obviously, it is more easier for multi-homed ASs to generate SA prefixes.
From the point of view of a provider, we define a prefix as a SA prefix if the provider receives the prefix originated by its customer from a peer instead of the customer. However, other cases can case the provider not to receive the prefix from it customer path. Here, we study 3 cases which may produce SA prefixes. Case 1: Split prefixes. Network operators can split one prefix into some more specific prefixes [7] . For example, a prefix "12.0.0.0/19" can be split into a more specific prefix "12.10.1.0/24". Then they announce the specific prefix to a provider through a peer link, and announce the original prefix to the provider through a customer path. They take advantage of this approach to balance load and tolerate link failures. If the customer path through which the more specific prefix is announced is broken, the prefix can be accessed through the other path. We define this configuration as Split Prefixes (SP). This configuration can produce SA prefixes.
For all prefixes in AS1, AS3549, and AS7018, we analyze the number of prefixes which belong to SP. If we find one prefix can be aggregated by another prefix, and both prefixes belong to the same source node but have different routes, those two prefixes belong to SP prefixes. Comparing with the number of SA prefixes, we find that the number of SP prefixes, shown in Table VIII , is so small that SP configuration is not the main cause of SA prefixes. The reason is that SP configuration can increase the number of prefixes in the upstream providers' BGP routing table, so that this method is not widely used.
Case 2: Aggregated Prefixes. A provider can allocate a part of its IP address space to its customers. When the provider receives prefix announcements from customers, these allocated prefixes can be aggregated by the provider so that those prefixes will not be announced to other ASs. For example, a customer is allocated with a prefix "12.10. Note that some origin ASs are the single-homed ASs. They must announce their prefixes to direct providers. For example, in Fig. 8(b) , AS announces its prefixes to its direct provider . AS is the last common AS of the best path and the customer path ! except the source and destination ASs. Therefore, it may be due to export policies of the AS or ASs after it, such as AS ! . In the single-homed case, we investigate how the last common AS exports prefixes from it and learned from its customers to its direct provider.
For each SA prefixes in AS1, we search all paths in BGP table to investigate how the customer (the originating AS or the last common AS) connects with the direct provider in the path. If the provider is left to the customer, the customer exports the prefix associated with the path to the provider. If between the provider and the customer, there is a upstream provider of the provider, then the customer does not export this prefix to the provider. For example, in Fig. 8(a) , if we find the path ! , exports its prefixes to ! . If we find the path " ! , does not export its prefixes to ! . This method depends on the number of peers in Oregon RouteView. Thus some of SA prefixes cannot be identified. In AS1, about 90% of SA prefixes can be identified by using this method. Among those identified prefixes, we find that about 21% of customers announce their prefixes to the direct provider, and about 79% of customers do not export prefixes to the provider. That is, in order to control their incoming traffic, some customers announce their prefixes or their customer's prefixes to only a subset of direct providers. Multihomed ASs can use the BGP conditional advertisement, in which some prefixes are advertised to one of the providers only if information from the other provider is missing [17] . This feature can be used to provide administrative control over traffic flow.
BGP community tagged with routes can explain the case that customers can export SA prefixes to the direct provider. One of the important utilizations of BGP community attributes is for traffic engineering. The wellknown NO EXPORT and NO ADVERTISE communities are related to prefix announcement [18] . Besides these values, there are some communities that are often used to indicate that receivers do not announce routes to a specified AS. A large number of ASs support this kind of community, and a lot of communities related to this utilization can be found in BGP tables [19] . Therefore, it is possible that direct providers or their upstream providers do not announce the customers' routes because of those communities.
From these 3 cases, we find that the major cause for SA prefixes is due to unannounced prefix. This implies that selective announcement policies employed by customers can affect the paths through which the top providers receive their prefixes. Providers may receive its customers' prefixes from their peers. However, if those peers do not announce these prefixes, providers cannot access customers. Afek et al. [20] studied policy atoms which are groups of prefixes with a common AS path at any Internet backbone router. [20] shows that most policy atoms are created by origin ASs' routing policies. Our work can answer the questions as to what kind of routing policies create the policy atom in [20] . Policies for exporting prefixes to provider are the major cause for SA prefixes.
We not that some special cases can also give rise to SA prefixes. For instance, an AS has several networks at different areas, but this AS does not have backbone to connect its networks. The AS will connect to the nearest providers for each network. AOL (AS1668) belongs to this case. We will study other cases which may affect our result in the future work.
B. Export to Peer
It is more complicated to infer what strategy peers use to export their prefixes to other peers, since a pair of peers can define flexible export policies to balance their inbound traffic. Here we focus on how a peer exports its prefixes to other peers. From Oregon's BGP table in Nov. 18, 2002, we investigate how the peers of AS1, AS3549, and AS7018 export their own prefixes to those 3 ASs. Fig. 9 shows the final re- sults for these 3 ASs. For AS1, there are only 6 ASs which do not export all of their prefixes directly to it. These ASs are smaller than AS1. There are 4 ASs which export most of their prefixes directly to AS1. Those ASs are larger ASs. They can do load balancing among their peer links. For AS3549, there are 9 peers which do not export some prefixes to it. However, the number is small. For AS7018, only 4 peers do not export all of their prefixes to it. From  Fig. 9 , we observe that most of those ASs export their own prefixes directly to their peers. That is, peers use simple export policy to other peers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrate how to infer the routing policies and characterize the routing policies. We first infer the import policy. We find that for most ASs routing preference among different routes conforms to AS relationships. Routes learned from customers are typically preferred over those from providers and peers, and routes received from peers are typically preferred over those from providers. Moreover, route preference assignment is based on next hop ASs. Second, we present an algorithm for inferring export policies, and characterize the export policies. Customers can export their prefixes to a selected subset of providers. For 3 Tier-1 ASs, we find a large number of prefixes are exported to a selected subset of providers. We find that prefix splitting and aggregation of prefix are not the main reason for the selective announcement. From our study, customers announce their prefixes to a subset of providers because of load . Furthermore, most peers tend to export their prefixes to other peers directly.
AT&T internal information, and anonymous reviewers for many valuable comments. ASs publish their rules, such as registering them in IRR database. AS12859, for example, publishes the semantics of community value in IRR, and AS6667 publishes the semantics of community values on its web page. Here we focus on how to infer the semantics if ASs do not publish them. The main idea is that because all ASs with the same relationship will be tagged with the same type of community, we just identify each kind of relationships for only one pair of ASs. Then all ASs that are tagged with the same type of community will have the same relationship.
Based on the number of prefixes from next hop ASs, We can infer AS relationships for some special ASs. Suppose an AS has providers, it will receive full BGP tables, or partial list of prefixes from them. It will also receive prefixes announced by customers. The big gap between the number of prefixes received from a provider and a customer indicates that one AS that announces the most prefixes is a provider. The AS that announces the lest prefixes is a customer. If the AS does not have providers, then the top one which announces most prefixes must be a peer. If the AS has both providers and peers, we can distinguish one provider by virtue of the largest number of prefixes it announces. All providers should have the same type of community value, and peers have different one from that of providers. A peer is the one that announces a large number of prefixes, and with a different community from providers.
For example, Fig. 10 shows the number of prefixes AS1 (GTE), AS3549 (Global Crossing), and AS8736 (Grapes Network Services) received from their next hop ASs. We sort these next hop ASs in non-increasing order according to the number of prefixes they announce. We observe that the number of prefixes can be described as power law. Because AS1 and AS3549 do not have providers, we conclude that the first several ASs (indicating in a circle in Fig. 10 ), which are larger ASs, such as AS701 (UUNET), are peers. And we also can conclude that the last several next hop ASs, indicating in a square in Fig. 10 , which announce very small number of prefixes, such as 1 or 2 prefixes, should be customers. In AS8736, one next-hop AS announces more than 100k prefixes to it, and then we conclude that that AS is a provider. Our conclusion for the semantics of AS3549's community is confirmed by this AS.
Step 3: mapping community to AS relationship. Based on their semantics of community values, we derive the AS relationships between these ASs and next-hop ASs. For the example above, prefix 80.96.180.0/24 is tagged "12859:1000" community in AS12859. According to Table IX, the relationship between next-hop AS8220 and AS12859 is peer-to-peer relationship.
